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is product substitutability, the lower is the incentive of firms to separate from
each other; the higher is the transportation costs, the wider is the distance sep-
arating the two firms at the dispersed equilibrium. Figure 1 synthesizes these
results. It shows the optimal distance from the endpoints as a function of γ, for
given values of t, the inner curves being associated to higher levels of the latter.
The SPNE values of a (= b), evaluated for each γ and t, are those comprised in
the shaded area. For example, all points in the vertical segment AB represent
firm i’s optimal locations when γ = γ0, as t varies from tmin (γ0) to t
cover (γ0),
while the interval [γ0, γ
0] is the range of values of γ which supports a dispersed
equilibrium with full market coverage by both firms, when t = 6/5.
3 Final remarks
In this paper we have extended the analysis by Shimizu (2002) who argues that
the degree of product substitutability doesn’t alter the equilibrium solution in
locations when firms compete on a linear city and the unit transportation cost is
upper bounded at t = 1/2. This restriction ensures full market coverage by both
firms from all pairs of locations; it is therefore a suﬃcient, but not a necessary
condition for duopolistic interaction over the entire market at the SPNE loca-
tions. By deriving the less restrictive necessary conditions, we show that when
the products are substitutes, the dispersed solution, coexisting with the agglom-
erated one, is indeed aﬀected by the degree of substitutability. As goods become
less substitutable, the distance between the firms at the dispersed equilibrium
narrows, while the range of values of t consistent at equilibrium with full market
coverage by both firms shrinks and shifts upwards. Imperfect substitutability
softens competition: from the one side both firms may profitably reach distant
locations even in the presence of high transportation costs; from the other side
firms may interact from closer locations at the dispersed equilibrium. Shimizu’s
result turns out to be a special case; it applies when the agglomerated equilib-
rium is unique, i.e., for a subset of the admissible values of t when the goods
are substitutes, for all admissible t when the goods are complements.
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